By constantly flexing the military’s cyber muscles to defend the homeland from inbound criminal cyber activity, the public demand for a broad federal response to illegal cyber activity is satisfied. Still, over time, the potential adversary will understand our military’s offensive cyber operations’ tactics, techniques and procedures.
The time needed to observe and assess, direct resources, make decisions, and take action will be too long to be able to muster a successful cyber defense.
Technical advancements bring us new options and abilities, and they increase mission success. But as with all uncharted territory, they also bring surprises and unanticipated outfalls.
AI is a top priority in the United States and to our friendly foreign partners, but potential adversaries will make the pursuit of finding ways to compromise these systems a top priority of their own.
There is too much turnover among non-commissioned officer/enlisted cyber operators to match the expanding need for a highly qualified and technically cognizant cyber force. Here's what the Army should do instead.
COVID-19 has created increased stress on our logistic, digital, public, and financial systems and this could in fact resemble what a major cyber conflict would mean to the general public.
The war fighter preparing for the future fight must be able to trust the cyber equipment’s readiness, and the absence of ordered cyber maintenance is an ongoing vulnerability.
The Pentagon's best coders address problems unburdened by traditional thinking, in innovative ways, maximizing the dual-purpose of digital tools, and can generate decisive cyber effects. So how should the Pentagon protect them?